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Criminal justice reform efforts sometimes seem improvisational.
Scholars and activists have built a persuasive case that we need to
reform the criminal justice system to reduce our reflexive dependency on
mass incarceration and to root out bias against the poor, the mentally
ill, and racial minorities. We know that actions like revising sentencing
laws and eliminating cash bail are steps in the right direction. And so
advocates around the country have been using any tools in grabbing
distance to achieve those results: legislation, ballot initiatives,
administrative or judicial regulations, or direct political action.
Strategic discussion of how to prioritize and harmonize those
approaches, or how best to build momentum among the states, however,
is frequently held behind closed doors when it is held at all.
Opportunistic arguments for reform can sound inconsistent and
undertheorized. Reformers sometimes strike populist notes, arguing as
the occasion demands that legislatures should yield to the will of the
people when public opinion supports change, that legislatures should
adopt enlightened policy regardless of public opinion, and that courts
should invalidate the choices of legislatures.
This essay will reflect on the toolbox of strategies for criminal
justice reform, offering examples of recent successes in state legislative
revision (Louisiana); in a ballot initiative where the state legislature
rejected reform measures favored by the public (Oklahoma); in state
and federal courts (challenges to debtors’ prison practices, and
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continuing litigation to ensure that indigent defendants are represented
by effective and adequately funded advocates); and in electoral
campaigns (the recent District Attorney primary race in Philadelphia).
The essay begins by commenting on the preconditions for
successful criminal justice reform campaigns, and concludes by
reconciling arguments for a populist criminal justice system with the
counter-majoritarian role of the courts. The role the Constitution
assigns to the people in the application of criminal justice system is to
check governmental overreaching but not governmental leniency. It
should be the role of the courts to check irrational or unfair criminal
justice policy regardless of whether that policy commands popular
support. While the federal courts have declined to play that role, state
courts, not limited by the constraints of federalism, can and should
become an important part of the solution to our broken criminal justice
system.
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INTRODUCTION
It’s easy to say what the ideal American criminal justice system
should look like.
It’s a lot more difficult to get there.
Our ideal system would end our counterproductive addiction to
mass incarceration, reducing the population of prisons and jails and
utilizing more, alternative means of addressing addiction, poverty, and
mental illness. It would address the unfair and disproportionate impact
of the administration of criminal justice on the poor, on people of color,
and on the mentally ill. And it would enable people leaving prison to
successfully reenter society.
We have some good ideas about particular things to do to begin
to achieve these goals. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
started a Campaign for Smart Justice in 2010, which aims to reduce the
prison population by fifty percent through strategies focusing on all
phases of the criminal justice system. We can control the number of
people in our prisons and jails by 1) reforming police practices to reduce
the sheer number of arrests, 2) reforming money bail practices and
eliminating de facto debtors’ prisons, 3) addressing prosecutorial
discretion and abuse, 4) eliminating excessive sentences, including
mandatory minimums, 5) promoting alternatives to incarceration, 6)
ameliorating unjust or short-sighted parole and probation practices, and
7) reducing barriers to successful reentry.1 Attentive reforms in each of
these areas can also help to cut the roots of bias.
So much has been written about each of these areas2 that rather
than reiterate why these are the right goals, this essay will address the
1

See Campaign for Smart Justice, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/massincarceration/smart-justice/campaign-smart-justice (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
2
See generally Marc Mauer & Kate Epstein, To Build a Better Criminal Justice
PROJECT
(2012),
http://sentencingproject.org/wpSystem,
SENTENCING
content/uploads/2016/01/To-Build-a-Better-Criminal-Justice-System.pdf
(explaining
the different barriers to criminal justice reform as well as the benefits of criminal justice
reform itself); William Galston, Criminal Justice Reform: Issues and Options for Our
INST.
(Oct.
14,
2016),
Next
President,
BROOKINGS
https://www.brookings.edu/research/criminal-justice-reform-issues-and-options-for-thenext-president/ (discussing the many problems in the current criminal justice system,
such as the cost of incarceration and the overpopulation of prisons, as well as potential
reform actions the federal government could take).
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challenging but less frequently discussed question of how best to achieve
these goals. What are the preconditions for success and how should we
strategize and prioritize approaches to the various branches of federal,
state, and local governments?
My goal here is to reflect on some recent successes and
strategies, particularly in the areas of sentencing and bail reform. This
essay focuses on the question of how changes were effectuated and by
whom: the legislative, executive, or judicial branch of government at the
federal, state, or local level, or even by the people themselves.
Part I outlines what seem to be necessary preconditions for
success: bipartisan cooperation, appropriate attention to state and local
initiatives, and educational efforts promoting supportive public opinion.
Part II discusses state efforts to reduce mass incarceration by
legislative modification of sentencing and other policies, using
Louisiana as a recent and informative example. Part II also examines
other paths to state policy reform, describing a winning 2016 ballot
initiative adopted in Oklahoma when state legislative reform appeared
impossible, and a less encouraging experience in Alaska where 2016
reforms are already being reexamined. The essay then offers several
examples of policy changes inspired by state executive branch officials,
such as the Maryland Attorney General, and judicial administrators. Bail
reform is one area in which policy change has been possible at the city
level, including in Biloxi, Mississippi, and New Orleans, either by local
legislative action or in settlement of litigation challenging previous bail
practices. As Part II shows, supportive public opinion has been a critical
part of the equation in reform campaigns.
Part III considers the role of litigation in reform efforts,
especially where public support or political will is lacking. Supreme
Court precedent has effectively precluded the federal courts from
reviewing legislative sentencing schemes for cruelty or irrationality.3
The Court has also disfavored federal judicial review of racial profiling
or racially discriminatory sentencing.4 This Part explains why the federal
courts nevertheless have an essential role to play in raising the level of
fairness in the administration of criminal justice, offering Gideon v.
Wainwright as a positive example of federal court intervention. The
Court interpreted the Sixth Amendment as mandating that states provide
counsel for indigent criminal defendants because a number of states had
3
4

See infra text accompanying notes 108–11.
See infra text accompanying note 113.
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persistently failed to shoulder that obligation on their own.5 Litigation
continues to be necessary to implement Gideon’s decree, as entirely too
many jurisdictions still do not provide adequate funding for indigent
defense.6 Regardless of the posture of the federal courts, state courts
have the opportunity to play a greater role in ensuring that both criminal
justice policy and implementation are fair and non-discriminatory in
their own states.7
Part IV looks at additional strategies for reducing incarceration
rates by focusing on the role of prosecutors, who wield considerable
power to expand or reduce the pipeline to prison even in the absence of
legislative change. To constrain the power of prosecutors, we need to
look beyond the legislatures and the courts to the people themselves.
The people in each state or community can and should play a role in
getting prosecutors to change ingrained practices leading to overly harsh
or discriminatory treatment, or in using their electoral power to change
the prosecutors themselves.
The conclusion comments on how the Constitution provides
support for a populist criminal justice system nevertheless constrained
by judicial review.
I.

PRECONDITIONS FOR REFORM

Why do some reform efforts succeed while others sputter? The
best recipe for change includes bipartisan support for reform efforts,
focus on the most promising level of government, and mobilizing
supportive public opinion.
A. Bipartisanship
To avoid gridlock in today’s hyper-partisan legislatures,
bipartisan support of reform measures is generally a necessity.
Fortunately, bipartisanship is flourishing in many areas of the criminal
justice reform agenda.
Recent scholarship has been hammering the point that our
current state of mass incarceration is not, as the conventional wisdom
might have had it, entirely attributable to tough on crime strategies
associated with the Republican Party. Historians have complicated the

5

372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring assignment of counsel for indigent criminal
defendants). See infra Part II.B.
6
See infra text accompanying notes 117–28.
7
See infra text accompanying note 121.
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politics of criminal justice reform by examining connections between
mass incarceration and liberal programs like the War on Poverty,8
maintaining that it is overly simplistic to attribute the rise of
incarceration to the War on Drugs,9 and noting the biracial origins of
some policing and sentencing policies now seen as oppressive.10
Instead of responding to these revisionist histories by engaging
in louder arguments about who is really at fault for the
counterproductive policies of the past, we can use this contested history
as an opportunity to forge greater agreement about directions for the
future. If it is unclear who is to be blamed for where we are, no one need
lose face by changing direction.
There is currently considerable agreement across the political
aisle on much of the ACLU reform program outlined above. What might
seem to be strange bedfellow alliances appear in sponsorship of reform
bills and in civic organization coalitions.11 The conservative group Right
on Crime, for example, has co-sponsored both conferences and reform
legislation with the ACLU. The group’s website explains that reform is
consistent with many fundamental conservative values:
8

See, e.g., ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON
CRIME 1–18, 63–95 (2016) (drawing connections between the two “wars”); NAOMI
MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA 69–
112 (2014) (addressing the involvement of liberals); James Forman, Jr., Fortress
America, NATION (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/fortressamerica/ (describing how 20th century liberals helped create mass incarceration).
9
See JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND
HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 5–6, 21–45 (2017) (arguing that the emphasis on
drug offenders as the major component of incarceration is misplaced).
10
See, e.g., JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN BLACK AMERICA (2017) (analyzing support for war on crime policies of the
1970s by African-American leaders in urban centers); MICHAEL JAVEN FORTNER,
BLACK SILENT MAJORITY: THE ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS AND THE POLITICS OF
PUNISHMENT (2015) (describing how support for New York’s draconian drug laws
united the “black silent majority” and conservative Republicans, while the white
liberal establishment pushed in the opposite direction). See also MARIE
GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN
POLITICS (2015) (noting that a simplistic racial analysis is complicated by gender,
class, etc.).
11
See, e.g., John Malcolm & Susan Herman, ACLU, Heritage Foundation Agree:
Reform Forfeiture Laws, DES MOINES REG. (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/2015/09/09/acluheritage-foundation-agree-reform-forfeiture-laws/71966978/ (noting that ACLU
and Heritage, while disagreeing on other issues, agree about the need to reform
asset forfeiture law).
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As the number of laws increased and the prison
population soared, conservatives chafed at the waste of
human potential and increasing cost of the prison
bureaucracy. They were frustrated that so little was
being done to prepare inmates for their release, and they
were appalled at the overcrowded conditions, violence
and rape, and the lack of medical care, drug treatment
and mental-health services. Conservatives joined with
liberals in backing such important reforms as the Prison
Rape Elimination Act, the Second Chance Act and the
Fair Sentencing Act. . . . The endorsement of the
reforms by these national conservative leaders
encouraged Republican legislators to vote for the
reforms, and it gave political “cover” to Democrats
leery of being labeled soft on crime. . . . 12
Indeed, the American Conservative Union Foundation, the Cato
Institute, the Faith and Freedom Coalition, the Family Research Council,
the Heritage Foundation, and the Institute for Justice, are all playing
major roles in the conservative movement for reforms. The Koch
brothers are investing substantially in criminal justice reform, including
sentencing reform,13 reducing over-criminalization,14 and promoting
“second chances.”15
These organizations, in combination with the efforts of the
12

Pat Nolan, Conservatives and Liberals Join Together for Criminal Justice
Reforms, RIGHT ON CRIME (Apr. 16, 2015),
http://rightoncrime.com/2015/04/conservatives-and-liberals-join-together-forcriminal-justice-reforms/. Right on Crime is a project of the Texas Public Policy
Foundation in cooperation with the American Conservative Union Foundation and
the Prison Fellowship. See http://rightoncrime.com/about/.
13
“Too many people go to prison—often for far too long—for low-level,
nonviolent crimes. People who break the law should be held accountable, but the
punishment should fit the crime.” Criminal Justice & Policing Reform, CHARLES
KOCH INST., https://www.charleskochinstitute.org/issue-areas/criminal-justicepolicing-reform/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).
14
“Thousands of seemingly ordinary activities, like shipping lobsters in the wrong
kind of container and shampooing hair without a license, are classified as crimes.
We shouldn’t criminalize so many things, and jail should be reserved for people
who are truly dangerous.” Id.
15
“Thousands of laws erect barriers for those with a criminal record to getting jobs
and rejoining their communities with dignity, increasing the likelihood of
recidivism.” Id.

Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

7

Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3
ISSUE 23:1

2018

SPRING 2018

STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM

39

ACLU and its other allies, have generated tremendous energy. This has
led to some significant progress in many states, lowering the prison
population by about five percent since 200916 and promising further
reductions in the near future. But as in any coalition, there will
inevitably be differences as well as agreement among the participants.17
As will be discussed, effecting further reduction of the prison population
may be more challenging, especially with respect to people convicted of
a crime involving violence.18
B. Level of Government
A second precondition for criminal justice reform in our era is
maintaining appropriate focus on state and local reform rather than
expecting a national cure or even leadership from the federal
government. In Congress, modest federal sentencing and policy reforms
that once seemed promising have become stalled in legislative gridlock.
A tremendous amount of bipartisan coalition work went into crafting
and lobbying for the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2017,
which aims to reduce sentences for low-level, nonviolent offenders in
the federal system.19 This legislation, sponsored by Judiciary Committee
Chairman Charles Grassley and cosponsored by a bipartisan group of
Senators, seemed likely to pass before the 2016 elections. But of course
not all members of Congress agreed with the Act’s provisions, and the
16

See Abigail Geiger, U.S. Private Prison Population Has Declined in Recent
Years, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 11, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/04/11/u-s-private-prison-population-has-declined-in-recent-years/.
17
See, e.g., Alex Sarch, How to Solve the Biggest Issue Holding up Criminal
Justice Reform, POLITICO (May 16, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/05/criminal-justice-reform-mens-reamiddle-ground-000120 (explaining how although both political parties agree that
one area of the criminal justice system, mens rea, needs reform, they have
struggled to agree on the particulars).
18
See infra text accompanying notes 43, 88.
19
See Karoun Demirjian, Bipartisan Senate Group Unveils Latest Attempt at
Sentencing Overhaul, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/bipartisan-senate-group-unveilslatest-attempt-at-sentencing-reform/2017/10/04/71d5ccea-a94b-11e7-850e2bdd1236be5d_story.html?utm_term=.97d8e939f3ab (discussing how members of
the Senate Judiciary Committee have worked for five years on the specifics of the
criminal justice reform bill introduced in October 2017); see also Bill Keller, Will
2017 be the Year of Criminal Justice Reform?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/will-2017-be-the-year-of-criminaljustice-reform.html (discussing the factors that could make 2017 a productive year
for criminal justice reform).
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partisan politics of Congress have since turned toxic. In February 2017,
the current U.S. Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, opposed passage of the
Act,20 having previously expressed ardent support for precisely the mass
incarceration/war on drugs policies the reform movement seeks to get
past.21 This Act may yet become law and serve as a positive example,
but at this point Congress would be following the states rather than
taking the lead. And in any event, the federal prison population is only a
small fraction of the population of state and local prisons and jails.22
The federal government could play a different kind of positive
role by supporting state and local reform, as proposed in another piece
of pending federal legislation, the Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act,
introduced in October by Representatives Ted Lieu (D-CA) and Carlos
Curbelo (R-FL), joined by Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) and Mia Love (RUT). This companion to the pending Senate bail reform bill (with
identical language) previously introduced by Senators Kamala Harris
(D-CA) and Rand Paul (R-KY)23 would provide grants to states that are
working to eliminate their money bail systems. The Justice
Reinvestment initiative, a similar approach, was successfully employed
in an earlier federal-state, private-public collaboration that used federal
grants to promote reform at the state and local levels.24 Most of the
states have modified their sentencing practices in recent years and
reduced their prison populations, often as result of this initiative.25
Although the states are the principal venue for reform of
20

Letter from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen. of U.S., to Charles Grassley, Chairman,
Comm. of the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate (Feb. 14, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000161-966d-da6b-ade9-fefd38e20001.
21
See Rebecca R. Ruiz, Attorney General Orders Tougher Sentences, Rolling Back
Obama Policy, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/us/politics/attorney-general-jeff-sessionsdrug-offenses-penalties.html.
22
See E. Ann Carlson & Elizabeth Anderson, Prisoners in 2015, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS (Dec. 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p15.pdf; see
also Matt Ferner, Americans are Sick of the ‘Tough on Crime’ Era,
H UFFINGTON P OST (Feb. 12, 2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/federal-justice-reformpoll_us_56be1a95e4b08ffac124f71e (discussing polling showing support for
reforms to the federal prison system, which only houses one tenth of the country’s
inmates).
23
Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act of 2017, S.1593, 115th Cong. (2017); see also
Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act of 2017, H.R.4019, 115th Cong. (2017)
24
See infra Part II.
25
See infra text accompanying notes 32–51.
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criminalization and sentencing policies, certain issues lend themselves to
even more localized attention. Cities and other units of local government
have been taking the lead on reform of bail practices, for example,26
showing that strategies for reform also need to take account of the
political organization of each state’s subdivisions in deciding whether
reform can best be achieved at the state, county, or city/village level.
C. Public Opinion
Another critical precondition for successful reform efforts is
fertile public opinion. There is some good news on this front. Polling
shows that the public throughout the country has become increasingly
receptive to some forms of change.27 Majorities of voters across the
country have been willing to rethink ostensibly “tough-on-crime,”
lengthy sentences and favor alternatives to incarceration—at least with
respect to nonviolent crime.28 A growing majority has favored
alternatives to prison, including drug courts and treatment options, for
low-level drug offenses.29
But here too, the conditions leading to modest success so far
may not bode well for a broader range of potential future reforms.
Whether the public’s receptivity to reconsidering criminal justice policy
can extend to other areas, including sentencing or parole reform for
26

See infra text accompanying notes 98.
See PFAFF, supra note 9, at 161–62 (asserting that “tough on crime” attitudes are
beginning to falter).
28
See Attitudes Toward Approaches to Lowering the Crime Rate in the United
States, GALLUP POLL (Dec. 21, 2010),
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2282; 91 Percent of Americans Support
Criminal Justice Reform, ACLU Polling Finds, ACLU (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.aclu.org/news/91-percent-americans-support-criminal-justice-reformaclu-polling-finds; Justin McCarthy, Americans Divided on Priorities for Criminal
Justice System, GALLUP, INC. (Oct. 14, 2016), (finding that Republicans prioritize
strengthening law and order through greater enforcement while Democrats
emphasize court and police reforms to reduce bias against minorities),
http://news.gallup.com/poll/196394/americans-divided-priorities-criminal-justicesystem.aspx; National Survey Key Findings – Federal Sentencing & Prisons, THE
MELLMAN GRP. (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/02/national_survey_key_findings_fe
deral_sentencing_prisons.pdf (presenting polls showing support for reducing
sentences for federal drug offenders).
29
See America’s New Drug Policy Landscape, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.people-press.org/2014/04/02/americas-new-drug-policy-landscape/
(noting that two-thirds of those polled supported treatment rather than harsh
sentences for drug offenders).
27
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those charged with offenses involving violence, is an important open
question.
Public opinion about criminal justice continues to be distorted by
erroneous beliefs about crime rates. Fifty-seven percent of those polled
in late 2016 believed that crime rates have increased since 2008, despite
the fact that Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Bureau of Justice
Statistics reports show that crime rates in general sharply declined
during that period.30
One of the most significant questions for the future of criminal
justice reform is whether public opinion will continue to move toward
acceptance of data-driven solutions, or whether exaggerated fear of
violent crime will stymy further reduction of the prison population.
Another key question is whether racial bias in the criminal justice
system will remain a polarizing issue.31
II.

LAW REFORM MODELS– PRIORITIZING APPROACHES

State legislatures, which enact criminal laws and formulate
sentencing policy, have generally been the focus of campaigns to reduce
the prison population. The legislative model of reform makes sense
where a state’s criminal justice policy itself overreaches—like excessive
mandatory minimum sentencing laws. But legislative politics are
complex and sometimes even measures favored by a majority of voters
fail to be adopted.
Alternatives in this situation include using a ballot initiative and
going directly to the people, or seeking administrative reform from
executive, judicial, or local officials with power to change policy—
albeit sometimes in a more limited manner or geographic area.
It is also worth noting how often success in a particular state has
been fueled by a nation-wide campaign.
A. Legislative Reform
1. Louisiana—Justice Reinvestment and Successful
State Legislative Reform
The Justice Reinvestment initiative played a major role, directly
or indirectly, in at least thirty-three states reforming their incarceration
30

John Gramlich, Voters Perception of Crime Continue to Conflict with Reality,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/11/16/voters-perceptions-of-crime-continue-to-conflict-with-reality/.
31
See infra text accompanying notes 52–59.
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policies.32 Launched in 2007, this public-private partnership has
included the United States Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice
Assistance, the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Council of State
Governments Justice Center, the Crime and Justice Institute, the Vera
Institute of Justice, and other organizations.33
The central concept is to reduce a state’s incarceration costs and
reinvest some portion of the saved resources in programs designed to
reduce the need for incarceration—like creating alternatives to
incarceration and drug courts. Participating states have created an interbranch, bipartisan task force to examine ideas for data-driven policy
changes. Reform efforts, often euphemistically described as
“comprehensive,” focus on sentencing policy, sometimes on conditions
governing release from prison, supervision of parolees or probationers,
and sometimes on oversight laws to measure the progress of reform.34
The legislature is then asked to enact the reform proposals.35
Louisiana, one of the most recent states to have adopted some
sentencing and other reforms, is a good example of the mechanics and
rhetoric of modestly successful change.
First, politically diverse reform coalitions made the case that
reform of Louisiana’s incarceration policies, beyond some changes the
state had previously adopted in 2011, was financially and logically
essential. 36 The campaign emphasized that:
• Louisiana had the highest incarceration rate in the world,
32

33 States Reform Criminal Justice Policies Through Justice Reinvestment, PEW
CHARITABLE TRS. (Dec. 2, 2016),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/12/33_states_reform_criminal_justi
ce_policies_through_justice_reinvestment; see also Justice Reinvestment Initiative,
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, https://www.bja.gov/Programs/jri_background.html
(last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
33
See id.
34
See id.
35
The Justice Reinvestment concept has not escaped criticism. See GOTTSCHALK,
supra note 10, at 98–116 (criticizing the reinvestment concept as myopic and
impotent to fight the tenacity of the carceral state).
36
Report and Recommendations, LA. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT TASK FORCE 62
(Mar. 16, 2017),
https://www.lasc.org/documents/LA_Task_Force_Report_2017_FINAL.pdf
(“Louisiana’s prison population dropped 9 percent from its peak between 2012 and
2015. This drop was driven . . . by retroactive reforms . . . passed in 2010, as well
as . . . when Louisiana first launched a Justice Reinvestment process in 2011 and
2012. . . . In 2016, the impact of these reforms began to wane, and reductions in the
population slowed.”).
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incarcerating five times as many people as Iran, thirteen times as
many as China, and twenty times as many as Germany;
• Louisiana’s imprisonment rate had more than quadrupled in the
last forty years despite the crime index falling by more than forty
percent over the past two decades;
• Because of this high imprisonment rate, Louisiana ended up
spending more than $625 million per year on corrections.
• If Louisiana’s incarceration rate were the same as Oklahoma’s
(the second highest in the United States), Louisiana taxpayers
would have saved nearly forty-nine million dollars in 2014.37
A carefully composed inter-branch bipartisan task force, called
the Louisiana Justice Reinvestment Task Force, examined practices in
Texas, Georgia, Alabama, and other states that had previously adopted
data-driven policy changes. After this study, the Task Force Report
recommended that Louisiana lawmakers adopt a number of reforms,
including reducing penalties for low-level drug and property crimes and
expanding alternatives to prison.38
The task force report sounds themes common to successful
justice reinvestment efforts in other states: smart (“data-driven” or
“evidence-based”) reform would save the taxpayers money
(“Louisiana’s taxpayers are not getting a good public safety return on
investment”) but without endangering the public (“Focus prison beds on
those who pose a serious threat to public safety”). Justice Reinvestment
was envisioned as setting in motion a positive cycle of events: freeing up
prison beds would free up financial resources, strategic reinvestment of
some of those resources would improve public safety by reducing
recidivism, and the decrease in crime would in turn contain prison
expansion.39 The Task Force predicted that if the proposed reforms were
adopted, there would be an overall reduction in the Louisiana prison
population of thirteen percent by 2027.40
37

LOUISIANANS FOR PRISON ALTERNATIVES, https://www.prisonreformla.com/ (last
visited Oct. 26, 2017).
38
Report and Recommendations, supra note 36.
39
See 33 States Reform Criminal Justice Policies Through Justice Reinvestment,
supra note 32. The states listed in the report as adopting some reforms are, starting
in 2007 and continuing through 2016, Texas, Nevada, Kansas, Vermont, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, New
Hampshire, South Carolina, Ohio, North Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, Kentucky,
Arkansas, Oklahoma, Hawaii, Georgia, Delaware, Montana, West Virginia, South
Dakota, Oregon, Mississippi, Idaho, Nebraska, Utah, Maryland, and Alaska.
40
Report and Recommendations, supra note 36.
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Expert studies on what works were touted as an appropriate
benchmark. On the economic front, the report announced that over half
of the projected savings—$154 million over ten years—would be
reinvested in “research-based programs that reduce recidivism and
services that support victims of crime.”41
Rhetoric played a role too. Some parts of the Task Force report
were written in a curiously indirect manner, perhaps in an attempt to
avoid raising the specter of hordes of people marching out of the
prisons: the reforms “would avert the projected growth in the number of
prisoners in Louisiana and bend the prison population downward.”42
And the report frequently reiterated that proposed sentencing reforms to
reduce prison terms targeted low-level, non-violent offenders.
Nevertheless, the Louisiana District Attorneys Association
posted a disclaimer at the very beginning of the report, immediately
following the table of contents: “The Louisiana District Attorneys
Association (LDAA) is committed to working within the goals of HCR
82 that include focusing prison space on serious and violent offenders.
Therefore, any policy recommendations contained in the Justice
Reinvestment Task Force Report that go beyond nonviolent and nonserious offenders the LDAA opposes.”43
In 2017, conditions in Louisiana were fairly conducive to
reform, despite partial resistance from the district attorneys’ association.
Coalitions formed. “Louisianans for Prison Alternatives” (founded by
the ACLU of Louisiana, Southern Poverty Law Center, and Voice of the
Experience) worked with conservative groups including Right on
Crime44 plus bipartisan groups, business organizations, and lawmakers,
to educate the public and to lobby for change.45
It is hard to say what impact these particular efforts actually had
on public opinion, but polls showed that Louisianans did strongly
41

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
43
Id.
44
Elain Ellerbe, Louisiana Justice Reinvestment Task Force Recommendations for
Criminal Justice Reform Released Today, RIGHT ON CRIME (Mar. 16, 2017),
http://rightoncrime.com/2017/03/louisiana-justice-reinvestment-task-forcerecommendations-for-criminal-justice-reform-released-today/.
45
See LOUISIANANS FOR PRISON ALTERNATIVES, supra note 37. The coalition
mobilized over six-hundred supporters to drive or bus to Baton Rouge on a humid
day in April, and generated hundreds of cards and letters and thousands of emails
and telephone calls. Sample message: “Getting tough on crime wasted money and
didn’t make us any safer. Get the facts.” Id.
42
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support “evidence-based programs that reduce reoffending over longer
prison sentences.”46 This support, combined with precedents set in other
conservative states like Texas and Georgia, helped to convince the
Louisiana legislature to adopt a “comprehensive” package of criminal
justice reforms without getting caught up in the procedural red tape or
anti-reform backlash that thwarted legislative efforts in some other
states.47 Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards signed the legislation.48
It was indeed politically possible in Louisiana to persuade politicians not
to fear endorsing policies that were not conventionally tough on crime.
Local jurisdictions instituted their own reforms, adding to the
state’s efforts. In January 2017, the New Orleans City Council
unanimously passed a municipal bail reform ordinance eliminating
money bail for most municipal charges.49 A coalition was behind this
effort as well: the Orleans Parish Prison Reform Coalition, which
included ACLU advocates. Baton Rouge is now a target for similar bail
reforms.
Similar positive stories can be told about legislative reform in
other highly conservative states. Mississippi, for example, enacted a
sweeping criminal justice reform measure in 2014. House Bill 585
reduced the state’s prison population by about ten percent
(approximately 1900 people) and reduced the prison budget by two
46

Adam Gelb & Andrew Page, Voters in Louisiana and Oklahoma Strongly Favor
Alternatives to Incarceration, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (June 28, 2017),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2017/06/28/voters-inlouisiana-and-oklahoma-strongly-favor-alternatives-to-incarceration (“Majorities
supported ending mandatory minimums, lessening penalties for low-level drug
offenses, increasing the fairness of fines and fees, and prioritizing reduced
reoffending over long prison sentences. Three in 4 Louisiana voters, including
majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and independents, backed a proposal to stop
imprisoning people for most parole and probation violations and to instead impose
sanctions, such as community service. More than half of Louisiana’s prison
admissions each year are for such supervision failures, and non-prison sanctions
could prevent many of those admissions, easing the strain on facilities and making
better use of public safety resources.”).
47
See infra Part I.B, text accompanying notes 75–77 (addressing vested interests of
Oklahoma prosecutors); see also infra Part I.C, text accompanying note 96
(addressing vested interests of Maryland bail bondsmen).
48
Rebekah Allen, Gov. Edwards Signs Criminal Justice Overhaul into Law, in
What Some Laud as Historic Achievement, THE ADVOCATE (June 15, 2017),
http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/legislature/article_168c6d6
e-5089-11e7-a0d6-7f67135f59a4.html.
49
Municipal Bail Reform, ORLEANS PARISH PRISON REFORM COALITION,
https://opprcnola.org/bail (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).
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hundred million dollars over ten years.50 Mississippi legislators
continued to consider bills to build on HB 585, including additional
parole and reentry reforms.51
These successes are heartening. The people of Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas were interested in evidence about what actually
works to reduce crime and moved beyond the vaunted tough-on-crime
strategies of the past. Of course, with the public being told that they
could simultaneously save money, reduce the prison population, reduce
crime, and better support crime victims, the choices before them may
not have seemed all that difficult.
But there is also reason to be circumspect about the Louisiana
experience. First, reducing the prison population by approximately ten
percent is nowhere near the fifty percent reduction for which the ACLU
has called. Perhaps a forecasted ten percent reduction in prison
population can grow incrementally if money continues to be pared off
the corrections budget and reinvested in alternatives to incarceration.
But dramatic reductions in incarceration ultimately will need to
encompass violent offenders as well, and both the Task Force and
District Attorneys Association seemed to assume that Louisianans would
not tolerate that result. Reducing prison sentences for low-level nonviolent offenders is the low-hanging fruit.
Another disappointing feature of the Louisiana task force report
is that it steers clear of issues relating to race. In seventy-six pages, the
report simply does not mention the demographics of Louisiana prisons
or the connections between racial bias and incarceration rates. This is
not because Louisiana has no problem on that front. The prison
population in Louisiana is 66.4%African American and 33.2% white;52
the population of the state is 63.2% white and 32.6% African
50

Gov. Phil Bryant signs criminal justice reform bill spearheaded by Pascagoula
Sen. Brice Wiggins, GULFLIVE.COM (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://blog.gulflive.com/mississippi-pressnews/2014/03/gov_phil_bryant_signs_criminal.html (note careful balanced
language).
51
Arielle Dreher, Reforming Criminal Justice: Is Mississippi Making Progress?,
JACKSON FREE PRESS (Feb. 1, 2017),
http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2017/feb/01/reforming-criminal-justicemississippi-making-prog/ (describing how state prison populations, as well as
parole applications and approvals, have changed since the implementation of
HB585).
52
LA DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORRS., DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES OF ADULT
PRISON POPULATION (2017).
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American.53 African Americans are approximately four times as likely to
be incarcerated in Louisiana as white people.54
Reduction in a state’s overall prison population does not
necessarily cure the racial disproportion of who is incarcerated. In New
Jersey, for example, reform efforts led to an overall reduction in the
state’s prison population of 9.5% over three years,55 but the most recent
figures show that African Americans in New Jersey are nevertheless
about twelve times as likely as white people to be incarcerated.56
It is troubling to consider why the carefully crafted messaging of
the Louisiana Task Force scrupulously avoided the issue of race. Rather
than offering the deplorable racial bias in Louisiana’s criminal justice
system as an additional powerful justification for reform, the Task Force
chose not to mention that aspect of the problem. Was this because the
authors believed that Louisianans would be apathetic about racial
injustice, or because they believed that talking about race would be
counterproductive?
One study on communications efforts regarding criminal justice
reform concluded that:
[C]ertain messages are more effective than others at
increasing public support for eliminating incarceration
for nonviolent offenses. I found that emphasizing the
high financial costs of incarceration, the ineffectiveness
of prison as a crime reduction tool, and the massive
53

QuickFacts Louisiana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2016),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/LA.
54
According to the Sentencing Project, based on Bureau of Justice Statistics
figures, the rate of incarceration is 438 per 100,000 for white people in Louisiana,
and 1740 per 100,000 for African American people. Ashley Nellis, The Color of
Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons, THE SENTENCING PROJECT
(2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Colorof-Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf at 5.
55
See S.P. Sullivan, How N.J. Became a Nationwide Leader in Reducing Prison
Population, NJ.COM (Oct. 31, 2015),
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/10/nj_cutting_prison_populations_faster
_than_most_sta.html.
56
The Sentencing Project, supra note 54 (white people in New Jersey incarcerated
at a rate of 94 per 100,000; African Americans at a rate of 1140 per 100,000); S.P.
Sullivan, Racial Disparity in N.J. Prison rates Highest in U.S., Report Finds, NJ.COM (June 14,
2016),
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/06/nj_has_12_times_more_black_prison
ers_than_white_on.html.
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growth in the use of incarceration caused by harsher
sentencing (not more crime) were most effective. By
contrast, emphasizing racial disparities in incarceration,
the harm done to children, and the mental health,
substance abuse, and childhood challenges common
among people in prison—while important points— were
no more effective in increasing support for criminal
justice reform than providing no message at all.57
While it is disappointing if the public does not find reducing
racial bias to be a motivation for reform, it may be a positive
development if attention to race does not undermine otherwise
promising reforms.
Race has long bedeviled sentencing policy. Reactions to the
crack epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s seemed inextricably tied to the
fact that crack, unlike powder cocaine, tended to be used by African
Americans.58 What was considered appropriate punishment for a crack
offense was draconian in itself and one hundred times as severe as
punishment for a comparable cocaine offense.59
57

Aaron Gottlieb, Criminal Justice Reform during the Trump Administration,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 22, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/criminaljustice-reform-during-the-trump-administration_us_592310eae4b07617ae4cbe37;
see also Russell Berman, A Poll-Tested Message for Criminal-Justice Reform,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/the-complicated-politics-ofcriminal-justice-reform/463284/ (discussing data that shows criminal justice reform
messaging is more effective in swing states when discussing issues of government
spending and waste).
58
For example, when Congress passed the Crack Cocaine Amendment in 2007,
roughly 86% of prisoners with crack cocaine convictions who qualified for a
reduced sentence were African American. See Glenn Schmitt et al., Analysis of the
Impact of the Crack Cocaine Amendment If Made Retroactive, U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N (Oct. 3, 2007), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/retroactivity-analyses/impact-analysis-crackamendment/20071003_Impact_Analysis.pdf.
59
The United States Sentencing Commission later found that federal sentencing
ranges for convictions involving crack cocaine, one hundred times sentences
authorized for the same quantity of non-crack cocaine, led to severe and unjustified
racial disparities in sentencing. See The Crack Sentencing Disparity and the Road
to 1:1, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/annual-national-training
seminar/2009/016b_Road_to_1_to_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2018). Congress
reacted to these findings, passing a Fair Sentencing Act in 2010, S. 17, 111th Cong.
(2010), but did not achieve parity in sentencing, settling for reducing the 100:1
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The current opioid epidemic may provide an opportunity to
extricate the debate over drug policy from issues of race and racism that
have plagued previous efforts to reform drug sentencing. The face of the
opioid epidemic is white.60 If we are now willing to adopt more humane
drug policies, that change of attitude could be taken as both progress on
the criminal justice front and a sad commentary on our lack of progress
in confronting racial bias.
Will general apathy toward concerns about racial bias and
mental illness, combined with exaggerated fear of violent crime, limit
the horizon of the next round of legislative reform? Or can the public
learn to appreciate these concerns as well?61
2. Oklahoma—”Leave the People’s Voice Alone”:
Unsuccessful Legislative Reform and a Ballot
Initiative
Oklahoma, another deeply conservative state, had the secondhighest overall incarceration rate in the country and the highest
incarceration rate for women.62 In 2016, its prisons were at 119% of
capacity.63
Republican Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives,
Kris Steele, tried to persuade the state legislature to adopt meaningful
measures to reduce the prison population without success.64 So he

ratio to 18:1. See Fair Sentencing Act, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
https://www.ussc.gov/topic/fair-sentencing-act (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
60
Why Is the Opioid Epidemic Overwhelmingly White?, NPR (Nov. 4, 2017, 5:43
PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/04/562137082/why-is-the-opioid-epidemicoverwhelmingly-white.
61
Although statistics show strong public support for addressing substance abuse
and mental health in criminal justice reform, a large number of respondents are still
apathetic. See Americans Support Expanding Addiction Treatment, LEGAL ACTION
CENTER (Nov. 2015), https://lac.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Survey-top.png;
see also Concern Too Many Non-Violent Drug Offenders are Imprisoned, LEGAL
ACTION CENTER (Nov. 2015), https://lac.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Surveybottom.png.
62
OKLAHOMANS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, https://okjusticereform.org (last
visited Mar. 19, 2018).
63
Brian Hardzinski, Fallin Presents Budget, Unveils Teacher Pay Raise and
Correction Reform, KGOU-FM (Feb. 2, 2016) http://kosu.org/post/fallin-presentsbudget-unveils-teacher-pay-raise-and-corrections-reforms.
64
See Graham Lee Brewer, Is Criminal Justice Reform on the table for the 2015
Legislative Session?, NEWSOK (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://newsok.com/article/5369665 (explaining how Oklahoma’s adherence to a
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agreed to become chair of an ACLU-led effort to take the issue of
reform directly to the people of Oklahoma. This broad-based coalition,
Oklahomans for Criminal Justice Reform,65 proposed two ballot
initiatives. The first initiative, Proposition 780, reclassified certain lowlevel crimes, like drug possession and low-level property offenses, as
misdemeanors instead of felonies, resulting in reducing the number of
people in the prisons by reducing the length of sentences. The second
initiative, Proposition 781, provided that the cost savings triggered by
the decreased corrections spending were to be invested in addressing the
root causes of crime through rehabilitation programs to treat drug
addiction and mental health conditions and through education and job
training programs to help low-level offenders turn their lives around,
find employment on release, and avoid going back to prison66—basically
the Justice Reinvestment platform.
The publicity for the Oklahoma initiatives, like the Louisiana
Task Force Report, sounded both pragmatic and financial themes,67 also
emphasizing that the offenders targeted were nonviolent. Polls showed
that a strong majority of prospective Oklahoma voters favored
sentencing reform for nonviolent offenders.68 Interestingly, seventyseven percent of Oklahomans said they knew someone who was or had
been in jail, prison, or another type of correctional facility,69 perhaps
giving these otherwise abstract issues a sympathetic human face. With a

“tough on crime” approach creates a difficult political climate for criminal justice
reform to succeed).
65
OKLAHOMANS FOR JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 62. Oklahomans for Criminal
Justice Reform included Oklahoma Council of Public Affairs, Right on Crime, the
Oklahoma Policy Institute, the Tulsa Regional Chamber, the Greater Oklahoma
City Chamber of Commerce, ReMerge, the Oklahoma Women’s Coalition, the
ACLU, and Women in Recovery.
66
See State Questions 780 and 781: Criminal Justice Reform, OKLA. POL’Y INST.
(Sept. 12, 2016), https://okpolicy.org/state-questions-780-781-criminal-justicereform/.
67
Launch Announcement, supra note 62 (stating that Oklahoma’s incarceration
policy “costs taxpayers nearly $500 million annually and drains significant
resources away from investments that can do more to enhance public safety. As the
state’s prison population continues growing—increasing by 12 percent between
2009 and 2014—so does its price tag, which has increased by 172 percent in the
past two decades.”).
68
Poll Results Show Strong Support for Reform, OKLAHOMANS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM (Apr. 24, 2017), https://okjusticereform.org/updates/poll-resultsshow-strong-support-reform/.
69
See OKLAHOMANS FOR JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 62.
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professional communications effort in place,70 the coalition gathered
230,586 signatures, far more than the number needed to get the
initiatives on the ballot.71 In November 2016, both initiatives passed
easily, with support of about fifty-seven percent of voters.72
But when the legislature convened in February 2017, several
bills had already been filed to repeal the reform measures, a possibility
because the initiatives did not amend the state constitution and were thus
open to legislative modification.73 The legislators who opposed the
reform measures were clearly outside the bipartisan consensus of most
Oklahoma voters but protested that the people had not understood for
what they were voting. The voters did not appreciate this condescension.
State Senator Ralph Shortey, a supporter of repeal efforts, confronted
two hundred angry constituents at what was described as a raucous town
hall meeting in Oklahoma City. “Do your job!” one constituent yelled at
Shortey. “Leave the people’s voice alone!” According to a reporter
present, the room broke into applause.74
Much of the counter-pressure urging legislators to support repeal
or modification measures was generated by the Oklahoma District
Attorneys Association. Unlike the Oklahoma voters, most prosecutors in
the state criticized or opposed the referenda. Steele, chair of the proreferendum campaign, remarked, “They are good at scaring and
pressuring and manipulating lawmakers into passing policies that

70

Launch Announcement, supra note 62 (“Oklahoma locks up too many of our
citizens for low-level offenses. We can do better. Let’s work together to ensure that
our criminal justice system is smarter, makes our communities safer, and gives us
the return on our taxpayer dollars that we deserve.”).
71
We Just Turned in Our Signatures, OKLAHOMANS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM (June 3, 2016), https://okjusticereform.org/updates/reached-bigmilestone/.
72
Kimberly Querry, Oklahoma Voters Pass Criminal Justice Reform State
Questions, OK NEWS 4 (Nov. 8, 2016), http://kfor.com/2016/11/08/oklahomavoters-pass-criminal-justice-reform-state-questions/.
73
Rachel Hubbard, Oklahoma Lawmakers File Bills to Repeal Criminal Justice
Reforms, NPR (Feb. 7, 2017, 6:16 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2017/02/07/513904322/oklahoma-lawmakers-file-bills-torepeal-criminal-justice-reforms.
74
See Bill Miston, Oklahoma Senator Ralph Shortey Submits Resignation Letter
After Being Charged with Engaging in Child Prostitution, OKLA. NEWS 4 (Mar. 27,
2017), http://kfor.com/2017/03/22/oklahoma-senator-ralph-shortey-submitsresignation-letter-after-being-charged-with-felonies-involving-child-prostitution/.
Shortey resigned from office the following month for other reasons. Id.
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ultimately benefit their position.”75
It is particularly interesting that prosecutors who opposed
implementation of the ballot measures sometimes did so regardless of
the views of the voters in their own districts. Voters in Oklahoma
County, which includes Oklahoma City, supported the initiatives by
almost seventy percent of the vote; but their District Attorney, David
Prater, opposed the measures.76 Prater insisted, despite contrary
evidence, that the threat of lengthy prison sentences is a necessary
incentive for drug addicts to change their behavior. In Tulsa, sixty-five
percent of voters supported the reforms; opposing Tulsa County District
Attorney Steve Kunzweiler erroneously maintained that Proposition 780
would make Oklahoma “the most liberal drug possession state in the
union.”77
But the people’s voice did prevail. Also in February 2017, while
the district attorneys were fighting the ballot initiative round of reform, a
Task Force assembled by Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin
recommended that the state take measures to drastically reduce its prison
population. Officials projected that, without reform, Oklahoma’s overall
prison population would increase twenty-five percent in the next ten
years at a cost to the taxpayers of $1.9 billion.78
Rather than rolling back the ballot measure reforms, the
Oklahoma legislature took up bills for a second round of reform—to
sentencing and parole policies.79 But the Oklahoma legislative process

75

Rory Fleming & Casey Tolan, Oklahomans Voted to Make the State’s Criminal
Justice System Less Barbaric, SLATE (Mar. 10, 2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/trials_and_error/2017/03/
oklahomans_want_a_less_barbaric_criminal_justice_system_the_state_does_not.ht
ml.
76
See id.
77
Id. (as the reporter noted, Kunzweiler seemed to overlook the fact that other
states have decriminalized or legalized marijuana); see also Andrew Freeman,
Criminal justice Reform Laws Roll out in Oklahoma, NEWS12 (July 6, 2017),
http://www.kxii.com/content/news/Criminal-justice-reform-laws-roll-out-inOklahoma-433017953.html (addressing district attorney opposition to the initiative
reforms, prior to roll-out).
78
Randy Ellis, Governor’s Task Force calls for decreasing sentences for drug
crimes, NEWSOK (Feb. 2, 2017), http://newsok.com/article/5536636.
79
Round 2: Rally for Criminal Justice Reform, OKLAHOMANS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM (May 4, 2017), https://okjusticereform.org/updates/round-2-rallycriminal-justice-reform/.
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once again stifled efforts at reform.80 Scott Biggs, a state representative
from Chickasha who is considered primarily responsible for boxing up
the new proposals in committee, drew fire for opposing the will of the
people. His response was that although some of his constituents did
support criminal justice reform, he believed they would draw the line at
keeping violent offenders out of prison just to help reduce the inmate
population and cut costs.81 He proposed further discussions on how to
hold the line dividing violent and nonviolent offenders.
Some additional policy reform efforts at the local level
succeeded in reducing the poverty-to-prison pipeline. Oklahoma City
instituted indigency hearings for those who cannot pay fines, and ownrecognizance release bonds for people who do not pose a threat to public
safety.82 The Oklahoma City Council created an Oklahoma County
Criminal Justice Advisory Council, a cooperative venture between
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma County, Edmond, and Midwest City, to
consider recommendations of a Vera Institute report.83 “With U.S.
Attorney General Jeff Sessions planning to visit the state in October to
discuss criminal justice reform with the Oklahoma Sheriffs’
Association,” the Right on Crime website observed, “the coalition has an
opportunity to showcase their reforms and show that reductions in jail
population while increasing public safety and reducing the burden on
taxpayers is possible.”84
80

Janelle Stecklein, Oklahoma Criminal Justice Reform Bills Locked up in
Committee, Proponents Say, CNHI STATE REP. (June 5, 2017),
http://www.cnhi.com/featured_stories/oklahoma-criminal-justice-reform-billslocked-up-in-committee-proponents/article_4bcf5e3e-4a1f-11e7-971cf3d2d85ee446.html.
81
Id.
82
Andrew Speno, A New Era in Criminal Justice for Oklahoma City, RIGHT ON
CRIME (Oct. 2, 2017), http://rightoncrime.com/2017/10/a-new-era-in-criminaljustice-for-oklahoma-city/.
83
Nomin Ujiyediin, Oklahoma County Law Enforcement, Judicial System to
Collaborate on Criminal Justice Council, KGOU (Aug. 30, 2017),
http://kgou.org/post/oklahoma-county-law-enforcement-judicial-systemcollaborate-criminal-justice-council. The report was issued in collaboration with
the Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Reform Task Force. To reduce the county
jail admissions and recidivism rates, the report recommended improving data
collection and analysis to understand the jail’s population, avoiding booking people
for low-level offenses, and improving addiction and mental health treatment,
among other measures. Id.
84
Andrew Speno, Follow Oklahoma County’s Lead on Criminal Justice, RIGHT ON
CRIME (Sept. 8, 2017), http://rightoncrime.com/2017/09/follow-oklahoma-countyslead-on-criminal-justice/.
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Polls show that a supermajority of Oklahomans continues to be
very supportive of expanding the use of alternatives to prison for
nonviolent crimes and allowing individuals to reduce their probation or
parole time through good behavior.85 Support is resoundingly bipartisan
(eighty-one percent of Republicans, eighty-five percent of independents,
and eighty-eight percent of Democrats approve) and extends to both
urban and rural areas.86 But the pace of state-wide legislative reform in
Oklahoma is still sputtering, and local reform is dramatically uneven
through the state.
The progress made in Oklahoma is good news, but, here too,
there is a low ceiling on the impact of policies aimed at diverting drug
offenders. The prediction was that the initiatives will end up reducing
the state’s annual prison admissions by twenty to twenty-five percent.87
Drug offenses constituted thirty-one percent of prison admissions in
Oklahoma.88 How much further can the state go in reducing
incarceration without including those convicted of offenses involving
violence?
Oklahoma also provides a lesson in the potential force of public
participation. Once persuaded that sentencing reform was desirable,
Oklahomans had to overcome two kinds of distortion in their state’s
political process. First, state legislators did not seem to reflect the views
of their constituents. The people of Oklahoma took direct action to see
their will done instead of waiting for the next election cycle and voting
in different representatives. Ideally, the legislators should have heard
and heeded that message, as the Louisiana legislature did. Second,
prosecutors, who are also the people’s elected representatives, were
more inclined to follow their accustomed, tough-on-crime practices than
85

Adam Gelb & Andrew Page, Voters in Louisiana and Oklahoma Strongly Favor
Alternatives to Incarceration, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (June 28, 2017),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2017/06/28/voters-inlouisiana-and-oklahoma-strongly-favor-alternatives-to-incarceration.
86
Id.
87
See Fleming & Tolan, supra note 75.
88
See OKLA. JUSTICE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 10, 20 (2017),
http://s3.amazonaws.com/content.newsok.com/documents/OJRTFFinalReport%20(
1).pdf (showing that forty-two percent of female inmates are admitted for drug
crimes alone, and thirty-one percent of prison admissions are on drug offenses); see
also Jonathan Small & Trent England, Oklahoma’s Prison Crisis: The Enormous
Cost of Doing Nothing, OKLA. COUNCIL OF PUB. AFFAIRS (Feb. 1, 2017),
http://www.ocpathink.org/article/oklahomas-prison-crisis-the-enormous-cost-ofdoing-nothing (showing that seventy-five percent of Oklahoma’s inmates were
sentenced for nonviolent offenses).
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to follow public opinion, even when that opinion was informed by
evidence that the policies of the past do not work. Part IV explores how
the public can use electoral politics to change the behavior of
prosecutors or the prosecutors themselves. This same electoral strategy
can apply to legislators.
3. Alaska: Legislative Reform and Backlash
Alaska was another criminal justice reform success story. A
commission proposed reforms to reduce the prison population by
revising sentencing for low-level offenders.89 The state legislature
adopted “extensively vetted” reforms which Governor Bill Walker
signed into law in July 2016.90
However, half a year later, before the bill’s reforms had become
fully effective, many of its provisions were being challenged. Members
of the commission itself questioned whether some of the reforms were
operating as intended, citing an uptick in crime.91 The most vocal critics
seemed to include law enforcement officials who may not have been
committed to the changes the public voted for and many whose opinion
may have been based on misapprehensions about the legislation itself.92
Alaska Governor Walker is now supporting increasing some of the
penalties that had been decreased.93
Alaska will not be the only place where people who support or
oppose reform legislation will be debating what happened after the fact:
whether the reforms failed, or whether lack of understanding of the
reforms and their consequences boosted a call for retrenchment. A
number of studies have suggested that reduction in prison population

89

See ALASKA CRIM. JUSTICE COMM’N, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT 18 (2015),
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/alaska-criminal-justice-commission.
90
See Jerzy Shedlock, Alaska Governor Walker Signs Crime Reform Bill into Law,
ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (July 11, 2016),
https://www.adn.com/politics/2016/07/11/alaska-gov-walker-signs-crime-reformbill-into-law/.
91
See Zaz Hollander, Alaska’s Sweeping New Crime Law Already Under Pressure
for Change, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/crime-courts/2017/01/25/alaskas-sweeping-newcrime-law-already-under-pressure-for-change/.
92
See id.
93
See Nathaniel Herz, Governor Wants Alaska Legislature to Toughen Criminal
Justice During Special Session, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/crime-courts/2017/09/15/governor-wantsalaska-legislature-to-toughen-criminal-justice-during-special-session/.
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does not, as a general matter, correlate with an increase in crime, and
might even have the opposite effect.94 Whether Alaska is in some
manner an exception or a negation of those studies remains an issue.
Alaska’s experience shows that legislative reform can be a long and
multi-chapter story.
B. Executive and Judicial Policy at the State and Local
Levels
Examples of successful state and local law reform have also
emerged from policymaking venues other than the state legislative or
referendum process.
For example, in Maryland, bail reform began with the state’s
Attorney General, was instituted by the courts, and then rescued from
legislative repeal. After Attorney General Brian Frosh issued an opinion
calling into question the constitutionality of bail practices in Maryland’s
pretrial system, the state judiciary enacted a rule deprioritizing the use of
cash bail.95 In a different example of vested interests trying to preserve
their own prerogatives—and, in this case, profits—the bail bond
industry fought aggressively to have the legislature reverse this reform.96
But with the efforts of the Coalition for a Safe and Just Maryland (which
included the ACLU), that effort was defeated.97 As in Alaska, reform
efforts turned out to be labor intensive as changes in the new policy
came under attack even after the battle seemed to be over.
Policies regarding bail reform are frequently set at the local
94

See, e.g., Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Inimai Chettiar, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
THE REVERSE MASS INCARCERATION ACT 7 (2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/reverse-mass-incarceration-act
(showing a decrease in crime rate in jurisdictions with reduced prison populations).
95
See Ovetta Wiggins & Ann E. Marimow, Maryland’s Highest Court Overhauls
the State’s Cash-Based Bail System, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/maryland-highest-courtoverhauls-the-states-cash-based-bail-system/2017/02/07/36188114-ed78-11e69973-c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html?utm_term=.49f1d745a228.
96
See Michael Dresser, Frosh Warns that Bond Industry-Supported Bail Bill
Undoes Maryland Court’s Rule, BALT. SUN (Mar. 14, 2017),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-bail-reform20170314-story.html (explaining that rival ACLU-supported bill to further move
away from dependence on cash bail also lost).
97
See Caryn York & Larry Stafford, One Small Step Forward on Bail Reform in
Md., BALT. SUN (June 29, 2017),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-op-0703-bail-rule-july20170629-story.html.
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level, as shown by the experiences of New Orleans and Oklahoma
City,98 compounding the notion that the politics of criminal justice need
to be local. Experience with bail reform also shows that litigation can be
essential to spur change.
Imprisoning people pretrial because they cannot afford to pay
bail is only one example of the unfair connection between poverty and
incarceration. Lack of ability to pay fines can lead directly to
incarceration, a modern-day equivalent of debtors’ prisons, creating a
vicious cycle where incarceration then exacerbates the prisoner’s
financial problems. Here too, litigation can be a lever for change.
For example, the ACLU brought a lawsuit on behalf of Biloxi,
Mississippi, residents Qumotria Kennedy and Joseph Anderson, alleging
that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated
when they were jailed for inability to pay fines.99 Kennedy was locked
up for five nights following her arrest on a warrant for failure to pay
traffic fines.100 She was not provided a court hearing on her ability to
pay, informed of her right to request counsel, or appointed counsel.101
She was ultimately fired from her part-time cleaning job because she
missed work while jailed for not paying her fines.102 Joseph Anderson,
who has a disability, was at home when police arrested him on a warrant
charging him with failure to pay a traffic fine.103 He was jailed for seven
nights before finally being brought before the Biloxi Municipal Court.104
Both Anderson and Kennedy were told that they could avoid jail only if
they paid the full amount of their fines and fees in cash.105
The City of Biloxi entered into a settlement making it a model
for eliminating debtors’ prison practices. The City agreed to a number of
reforms: issuing bench cards to guide judges in conducting ability-topay hearings and assessing legal alternatives to incarceration; ending the
use of private probation companies; hiring a full-time public defender;
98

See supra text accompanying note 49 (New Orleans), note 82 (Oklahoma City).
See also Lisa Hagen, In Unanimous Vote, Atlanta City Council Approves Cash Bail
Reform, WABE (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.wabe.org/unanimous-vote-atlanta-citycouncil-approves-cash-bail-reform/.
99
Class Action Complaint at 6, Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No. 1:15-CV-00348HSO-JCG, 2016 WL 4425862 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 7, 2016).
100
Id. at 23.
101
Id. at 24–25.
102
Id. at 26.
103
Id. at 27, 29.
104
Id. at 30.
105
Kennedy, 2016 WL 4425862 at 23, 29.
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and prohibiting imposition of fees for people who enter payment plans
or who are required to perform community service.106 Advocates are
now working to take reforms based on the Biloxi template state-wide.
But it is notable that it took a lawsuit to get the city to embrace
thoughtful solutions.
Even this small collection of stories shows that achieving policy
reform requires a different blueprint for every state. One size does not fit
all, even if national campaigns like Justice Reinvestment can introduce
the same themes and core reforms to multiple states. National
organizations play an important role in identifying which states to
prioritize, which reforms to prioritize, and which branch of government
at which level to address first. As in a game of dominoes, how much can
be achieved depends on choosing the right place to start.
So far, the bottom line condition for persuading elected officials
to change criminal justice policy has seemed to be public opinion.
Further progress will depend on whether reformers can create conditions
for further public education about how a smart and fair criminal justice
system should work. This is not so much a challenge for law as it is for
marketing.107
III.

THE JUDICIAL MODEL

Although criminal justice policy ideally will be of the people, by
the people, and for the people, there are nevertheless times when the
counter-majoritarian courts are needed to counteract popular will or
popular apathy in order to ensure the fairness of criminal justice policy
or administration.
A. Judicial Review of Deprivations of Freedom
The federal courts are unlikely to play any meaningful role in
reviewing criminalization and sentencing policies for fairness or
rationality. The Supreme Court has applied only the most deferential
106

See Stipulated Settlement Agreement and Retention of Jurisdiction at 3–21,
Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No. 1:15-CV-00348-HSO-JCG, 2016 WL 4425862
(S.D. Miss. Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/kennedy-v-citybiloxi-stipulated-settlement-agreement-exhibits-b.
107
See Nan D. Hunter, Varieties of Constitutional Experience: Direct Democracy
and the Marriage Equality Campaign, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1662, 1668, 1700 (2017)
(discussing how communications professionals developed a marketing campaign
reframing the issues around same-sex marriage and changing public opinion, with
the result that direct democracy began to work for rather than against marriage
equality).
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level of judicial review to state or federal criminal justice policies or
practices that cost people years of freedom, regardless of how irrational,
cruel, or counterproductive those policies might be. The Court has
deferred to state sentencing policy in cases challenging mandatory
imposition of life imprisonment without any possibility of parole for
drug possession offenses108 or for minor theft offenses (including
sentences imposed under three-strikes laws),109 finding that even
draconian deprivation of freedom for minor offenses does not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Irrationality is not a basis for federal judicial review of
sentencing policy. In Chapman v. United States,110 for example, the
Court upheld a federal sentencing guideline providing a penalty for
possessing a quantity of LSD on a sugar cube that was many times
greater than the penalty for possessing the same quantity of LSD on a
piece of blotter paper.111 It was the combined weight of drug and carrier
that mattered under the guidelines, not the weight of the controlled
substance itself. The Court was interested only in whether the
lawmakers had intended this bizarre result and not whether that
sentencing scheme irrationally deprives some hapless individuals of
extra years of freedom merely because they substituted a sugar cube for
a piece of blotter paper.
Although the federal courts have taken a hands-off approach in
this area, state courts could, and perhaps should, take a more active role
in reviewing whether state sentencing law needlessly deprives
individuals of years of freedom under policies that do not appreciably
further any legitimate public interest.
Neither the federalism concerns underpinning the Supreme
Court’s reluctance to review state policy decisions nor the Court’s
108

See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (holding that life sentence
without the possibility of parole for the possession of 672 grams of cocaine was not
cruel and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment).
109
See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (holding that sentence of life
imprisonment for stealing videotapes worth $150, a third conviction, was not cruel
and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment); see also Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (holding that third strike sentence of life
imprisonment for theft offense was not unconstitutional).
110
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
111
See id. at 458 n.2. If 100 doses of LSD were sold on sugar cubes, the sentence
would range from 188–235 months; if the same dosage were sold on blotter paper,
the sentence range would be 63–78 months; if the same dosage were sold in its pure
liquid form, the range would be 10–16 months.
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cramped interpretations of the meaning of cruel and unusual
punishment, denial of equal protection, and denial of due process need
constrain the state courts. Reformers should think creatively about the
potential of state constitutional provisions and invite state courts to play
an active role in reviewing their states’ criminal law and sentencing
policies as well as criminal procedure. Sherry Colb, for example, has
argued that courts should regard freedom from incarceration as a
fundamental right, worthy of more than minimal judicial solicitude.112
Recognizing the importance of the individual interest at stake, state
courts could find that excessive state sentences deprive individuals of
the fundamental right to years of freedom without actually furthering the
state’s interest in preserving public safety or other proper aims of
criminal law.
B. Unconstitutional Practices
The Supreme Court has also led the federal courts to turn a blind
eye to racially disproportionate practices in the administration of
criminal justice, including racial profiling and discriminatory
sentencing.113 Here, too, state courts should accept the responsibility of
addressing inequality in their states’ administration of criminal justice
when legislatures and public opinion are inattentive.
There have, of course, been important exceptions to the Supreme
Court’s laissez-faire attitude to state criminal justice. Prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,114 many states had
undertaken to appoint counsel to indigent defendants facing a felony
charge, but a number of other states, including Florida, had not. In
Gideon, the Court found that the Sixth Amendment requires the state to
provide an attorney for indigent felony defendants as a matter of
fundamental fairness. Gideon’s mandate was subsequently expanded to
apply to misdemeanor prosecutions resulting in incarceration.115
112

Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is this Right Different from
All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781 (1994).
113
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (declining to find racial
disparities in imposition of Georgia death penalty to constitute a denial of equal
protection of the law).
114
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (finding that Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, including a right to assigned counsel for the indigent, applies to
state as well as federal felony prosecutions).
115
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367
(1979) (finding that assigned counsel is required in cases where sentence of
incarceration is imposed).
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The rule in Gideon was clear and not at all unpopular.116 But in
many states, the political will still does not seem to exist to allocate
adequate funds for the criminal defense function. Inadequate support for
defense counsel is a critical problem, as approximately eighty percent of
criminal defendants cannot afford to hire defense attorneys.117
In the half century since Gideon, litigation has been necessary in
more than a dozen states to enforce the states’ obligation to provide
minimally adequate counsel to indigent defendants.118 Without adequate
financial resources, public defenders and court-appointed attorneys
stagger under unreasonable caseloads, cannot engage appropriate
experts, and sometimes cannot make a living.119 State spending on
prosecutions has frequently dramatically outpaced expenditures on
required defense attorneys.120 Louisiana, for example, was forty-third in
per capita defense funding while it was the number one incarcerator in

116

See Yale Kamisar, The Gideon Case 25 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,
1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/16/opinion/the-gideon-case-25-yearslater.html (observing that the Gideon decision was one of the most popular
decisions handed down by the Supreme Court).
117
Michael W. Macleod-Ball & Kanya Bennett, ACLU Letter to SJC re: Indigent
Defense Hearing, ACLU (May 23, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-lettersjc-re-indigent-defense-hearing.
118
See Vidhya Reddy, Indigent Defense Reform: The Role of Systemic Litigation in
Operationalizing the Gideon Right to Counsel 38–54 (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 1279185, 2008),
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/resources/caseStudy_VidhyaKReddy_1224
854933.pdf; see also Darryl Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 MO. L.
REV. 907, 910–11, 911 n.18 (2010) (listing litigation in fifteen states: Alabama,
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, and
West Virginia).
119
See Oliver Laughlan, Justice Denied: The Human Toll of America’s Public
Defender Crisis, GUARDIAN (Sept. 7 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/sep/07/public-defender-us-criminal-justice-system.
120
See Emily Badger, The Meteoric, Costly and Unprecedented Rise of
Incarceration in America, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/04/30/the-meteoric-costlyand-unprecedented-rise-of-incarceration-in-america/?utm_term=.a9fd1af7e720
(discussing how state spending on incarceration has outpaced all other state
spending except Medicaid); see also Erinn Herberman & Tracey Kyckelhahn, State
Government Indigent Defense Expenditures, FY 2008–2012 –Updated, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS (July 2014),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sgide0812.pdf.
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the country.121 Oklahoma, when it was the fourth highest incarcerator,
was thirty-eighth in criminal defense expenditures.122 Some states have
tried to fix the problem of lack of parity through legislation. For
example, some statutes require that prosecutors and court-appointed
defense attorneys be paid comparable salaries.123
But even these efforts have not always been successful in
achieving parity. While incarceration policy is generally set at the state
level, almost half the states require local governments to bear the
responsibility of funding indigent defense.124 This causes spending
disparities within states and sometimes leaves impoverished state
subdivisions in a financially impossible situation. Congress was asked to
address this multi-state problem through federal legislation in 2015, but
nothing came of the proposed legislation.125
The ACLU and its affiliates have been involved in dozens of
time-consuming, resource-draining lawsuits trying to compel states or
their subdivisions to provide adequate levels of defense funding.126 In
121

See Brown, supra note 114, at 919–20. These stark numbers can be somewhat
misleading, as many other variables other than funding can affect the adequacy of
defense counsel, but the disparity is nevertheless significant.
122
Id. at 920; see also Ryan Gentzler, Cuts to Indigent Defense System Have Left
Our Justice System Deeply Unbalanced, OKLA. POL’Y INST. (May 3, 2016),
https://okpolicy.org/cuts-indigent-defense-system-left-justice-system-deeplyunbalanced/ (discussing how funding for indigent defense in Oklahoma has
remained flat for fifteen years).
123
See, e.g., Marta Mudri, Judicial Impact Statement: Indigent Defense, OHIO
JUDICIAL CONF. 3 (Sept. 11, 2013),
http://www.ohiojudges.org/Document.ashx?DocGuid=c3cf7170-a70b-4738-83951397c9bc3901.
124
See Tanya Greene, (Zealous, Properly-Resourced Defense) Lawyers for All!,
ACLU (Mar. 19, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/zealousproperly-resourced-defense-lawyers-all; see also Sarah Breitenbach, Right to an
Attorney? Not Always in Some States, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Apr. 11, 2016),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2016/04/11/right-to-an-attorney-not-always-in-some-states.
125
See Carl Hulse, Why the Senate Couldn’t Pass a Crime Bill that Both Parties
Backed, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/politics/senate-dysfunction-blocksbipartisan-criminal-justice-overhaul.html.
126
See, e.g, Flora v. City of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2015) (alleging gross
and chronic underfunding of Pennsylvania county public defender’s office);
Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988), rehearing denied, 896 F.2d 479
(11th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 495 US 957 (1990) (first case to allow
certification of a class challenging inadequacy of indigent defense funding, in
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some cases litigation has led to a settlement; in others, federal courts
have had to impose solutions. Only occasionally are state courts willing
to play a role in ensuring that the state’s obligation is met. For example,
in a groundbreaking 1993 case, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that
the state’s indigent defense funding practices violated the Louisiana
state constitution.127 Here too, it would be a welcome development for
state courts to undertake greater responsibility and ensure that their
states are complying with Gideon, as well as other elements of fair
criminal procedure. The courts can be part of a dialogue inspiring
policymakers to rethink their practices. As one litigator commented
about an indigent defense funding lawsuit, “the constant pressure of the
lawsuit itself, as well as the chance that the judiciary might fashion a
remedy, helped legislators understand the value of designing their own
reform template.”128
Georgia); Class Action Complaint at 3–4, 14, Burks, et al. v. Scott City,
Mississippi, 3:2014cv00745 (S.D. Miss. 2017) (describing how people who
couldn’t afford bail were routinely held in jail for as long as a year without
appointed counsel or an indictment); Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d
1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (finding that public defense system of Mt. Vernon and
Burlington deprived indigent persons facing misdemeanor charges of their
fundamental right to assistance of counsel); ACLU, ACLU of Utah and Holland &
Hart LLP Announce Lawsuit Against State of Utah Over Indigent Defense (June 21,
2016), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-utah-and-holland-hart-llp-announcelawsuit-against-state-utah-over-indigent-defense; ACLU, Federal Court Finds
Public Defense System Violates Constitutional Rights of Indigent Defendants (Dec.
5, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/news/federal-court-finds-public-defense-systemviolates-constitutional-rights-indigent-defendants (towns in Washington state);
ACLU, ACLU Hails Montana’s Public Defense Bill as Leading National Trend
(June 8, 2005), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-hails-montanas-public-defense-billleading-national-trend (describing settlement in wake of class action lawsuit)
(2005); Tanya Greene, Victory! Michigan Turns the Corner on Public Defense
Reform, ACLU (July 1, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-lawreform/victory-michigan-turns-corner-public-defense-reform; Simon McCormack,
Long-Awaited Public Defense Reform Comes to New York State, ACLU (May 9,
2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/mass-incarceration/smart-justice/long-awaitedpublic-defense-reform-comes-new-york-state (settlement of Hurrell-Harring v.
State, 15 N.Y.3d 8 (2010), challenging New York’s public defense system for
failure to provide adequate funding, resources, and oversight to the public defense
system).
127
State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 783 (La. 1993).
128
Greene, supra note 124.
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Litigation can be an essential lever for affecting change in other
areas, as well. The new model practices in Biloxi, Mississippi, as one
example,129 started with a lawsuit—which was then settled through
institution of a set of reforms that might not have been politically
feasible without the pendency of a lawsuit.
On the whole, while the federal courts do have a significant role
to play on some issues, it is clearly too much to expect that they will
lead the way to the ideal criminal justice system of the future. The state
courts may be another matter, at least in some states. Reformers need to
evaluate choice of courts state-by-state and, ideally, develop a
coordinated approach to prioritizing which state courts should be asked
to be the first domino.
IV.

THE POPULAR PARTICIPATION MODEL

Policy reform on issues like criminalization and sentencing
ranges can control the overall size of the pipeline into prison. But it does
not address problems and disparities in the administration of criminal
justice, which can distort the size and demographics of the prison
population. Once criminal law has been adopted at the appropriate level,
it must be applied by police, prosecutors, judges, and other executive
agencies (including parole boards), all of which are afforded
considerable discretion. At each of these phases, discretion provides
opportunities to expand or reduce the number of people in the pipeline,
as well as opportunities to propagate or reduce discrimination.
Police discretion determines how many people are arrested. Law
enforcement agencies, by changing their arrest practices, could
significantly reduce the size of the pipeline to prison. In his provocative
recent book, Alex Vitale suggests that we need to fundamentally
reexamine our ideas about the nature and goals of policing itself,130
going beyond a focus on whether a particular jurisdiction’s policing is
arbitrary or discriminatory in practice. In Vitale’s view, it is not a matter
of accident but of design that policing as an institution reinforces race
and class inequalities.131 Might increasingly informed public opinion
create the conditions for a serious reexamination of not only arrest but of
policing practices in some number of localities?
Police discretion also determines which particular people will be
129

See supra, text accompanying notes 99–106.
ALEX VITALE, THE END OF POLICING (2017).
131
Id. at 28–30.
130
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arrested and placed on the path to prison. We know with all too much
certainty that police discretion is, to varying extents, applied in a racially
discriminatory manner.132 A wide variety of approaches to controlling
abuse or bias in policing has been attempted or suggested, ranging from
reforming overbroad stop and frisk policies,133 to focusing on
community policing,134 to diversifying law enforcement personnel.135
For decades, experts have argued about the extent to which the public
should play a direct role in holding law enforcement accountable
through civilian complaint review boards.136 Contemporary scholars
argue that the people also have a powerful informal role to play in
monitoring police conduct through community “copwatching.”137
132

See, e.g., ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE (2013),
https://www.aclu.org/report/report-war-marijuana-black-and-white (stating that,
nationally, black people are 3.73 times as likely to be arrested for the same
marijuana offense as white people, despite roughly equal marijuana use); PFAFF,
supra note 9, at 45–49.
133
See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 2014).
134
See, e.g., OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, ABOUT COPS,
https://cops.usdoj.gov/about (explaining that the Department of Justice has created
its own community policing initiative, COPS, to promote community policing
practices nationwide); see also Charlie Beck and Connie Rice, How Community
Policing Can Work, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/opinion/how-community-policing-canwork.html.
135
Jen Fifield, Can Diverse Police Departments Ease Community Tension?, PBS
(Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/can-diverse-policedepartments-ease-community-tension; see also WOMEN IN FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT, Transforming Law Enforcement by Changing the Face of Policing
(Sept. 2016),
http://www.wifle.org/pdf/TransformLawEnforcementbyChangingFaceofPolicingWIFLEFinal9272016.pdf.
136
See James R. Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability, LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS (1971),
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3349&context=lcp
(explaining the need for and potential problems with police review boards after
they were first established in New York City and Philadelphia); see also Peter Finn,
Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE
(Mar. 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/184430.pdf (exploring the pros
and cons of various types of police oversights systems); Priyanka Boghani, Is
Civilian Oversight the Answer to Distrust of Police?, FRONTLINE (July 13, 2016),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/is-civilian-oversight-the-answer-todistrust-of-police/ (discussing the need for more police oversight boards in the
aftermath of multiple police-involved shootings).
137
See Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391 (2016) (discussing
community observation of police).
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Of the many important questions concerning how to achieve
appropriate oversight and accountability of law enforcement,
prosecutors, judges, parole boards, etc., the one I want to focus on here
is popular participation in prosecution and adjudication of crimes. What
might an educated public accomplish through involvement in the
criminal justice system going beyond traditional legislative means?
A. We, the People
Just as communities can play a role in oversight of the police,
formally or informally, they can also involve themselves in ameliorating
the destabilizing impact of bail138 and in observing trials and other
phases of criminal adjudications.139 People can use these observations as
a basis for influencing not only policy but personnel: whom to appoint
or elect to positions like sheriff, prosecutor, judge, or parole board
member.
Although not specific to all of these areas, there is strong
historical precedent for valuing the role of the people in implementing
criminal justice: the United States Constitution’s provision for
substantial and direct popular participation in the prosecution and
adjudication of criminal cases.
Both Article III and the Sixth Amendment provide that all
federal
criminal
trials
shall
be
by jury,140 and the Fifth Amendment provides that no person can be
“held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”141 The people, through their
service on grand and petit juries, were intended to serve as one of two
decision-makers in criminal prosecutions (with judges as the other). As
with many of the Constitution’s schemes, jury decision-making is a oneway ratchet: the people have the power to ameliorate the impact of harsh
legislative or prosecutorial decisions by declining to indict, by acquittal
on the facts, or even by nullification of the law. The people as jurors do
not, however, have the power to make the law harsher than
138

Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585 (2017) (discussing
community participation in funding bail).
139
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (enumerating the right to a speedy and public trial).
140
U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by jury”);
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed.”).
141
U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing exceptions for military trials).
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policymakers, police, and prosecutors have done.
Today, of course, jury trials are rare,142 and the Supreme Court
held long ago that the right to grand jury indictment does not force the
states to allow democratic participation in indictment decisions.143 Few
people take part in the criminal justice system in the direct manner the
Constitution envisioned: by serving as jurors or grand jurors in particular
cases.
But the Sixth Amendment right of public participation is not
moribund. It may be that the mere possibility of facing a jury has an
impact on prosecutorial decisions, as prosecutors are likely to offer a
more attractive plea bargain in a case where conviction seems doubtful.
And because of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, members of
the public can nevertheless play a significant role in observing trials as
well as other phases of criminal adjudications, and then seeking
accountability for conduct of which they disapprove.144
It is also noteworthy that in the exceptional line of cases where
the Supreme Court did intervene in sentencing policy decisions, one of
the Court’s primary rationales was to preserve the power of juries. In
Apprendi v. New Jersey,145 the Court invalidated a state scheme allowing
judges to enhance a sentence based on facts found at a sentencing
hearing rather than at trial. One of the Court’s principal explanations for
its holding was that the right to trial by jury should be taken to mean that
the jury must have the opportunity to determine the facts on which
sentencing will be based.146 Apprendi’s revolutionary holding147 was
then applied to upend both state148 and federal149 sentencing guidelines
schemes.
The Supreme Court Justices could not have been operating on
142

U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL CASES (July 13, 2017),
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=23 (showing that over ninety-five
percent of felony convictions are obtained through plea bargains).
143
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
144
SUSAN N. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL 18–30 (2006);
Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 2173 (2014).
145
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490–92 (2000).
146
Id. at 476–77, 490. See also Scalia, J., concurring, id. at 498–99 (discussing the
central significance of the right to trial by jury).
147
See Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
You Say You Want a Revolution?, 87 IOWA L. REV. 615 (2002).
148
See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
149
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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the assumption that jury trials are the norm, but they nevertheless took
the Constitution’s provision of a role for the people seriously enough to
be willing to upset legislatively adopted state and federal sentencing
guidelines schemes. The spirit of the Constitution’s citizen participation
provisions remains alive, even if the form of participation may have
changed.
B. The People’s Lawyer
One of the most effective ways for members of the public to
have an impact on the administration of criminal prosecution is to pay
closer attention to the election of prosecutors. The experience in
Oklahoma described above shows that prosecutors can develop vested
interests in how criminal law should be administered, interests not
always consistent with their constituents’ views.150
While prosecutorial power can be a problem, it can also be an
opportunity to reduce the prison population beyond what can be
accomplished in the legislatures. Prosecutors have a remarkable amount
of control over the caliber of the pipeline to prison, exercising an
enormous amount of unchecked discretion in deciding whom to charge
with what crimes, and what plea bargains to offer.151 This remarkable
level of unconstrained and unreviewable discretion is exercised behind
closed doors, with little transparency. This leaves prosecutors free to
thwart the will of their constituents. John Pfaff reports that during the
1990s and 2000s, even as both the crime rate and arrest rate fell, the
number of felony case filings in state court increased because of
discretionary prosecutorial decisions.152 In states where sentencing
ranges have been reduced for a particular offense, some prosecutors
have set out to vitiate reforms by adding a different charge with a longer
sentencing range.153
A few states have considered or adopted proposals for statutory
or other approaches to constrain prosecutorial discretion. New Jersey,
for example, created plea bargaining guidelines.154 But in most
150

Supra, text accompanying notes 72–77 (Okla.); see also supra, text
accompanying note 43 (prosecutors’ disclaimer in Louisiana task force report).
151
See PFAFF, supra note 9, at 127–59.
152
Id. at 127.
153
Id.
154
Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, Are Prosecutors the Key to Justice Reform?,
ATLANTIC (May 18, 2016),
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jurisdictions, the legislatures have failed to assert any sort of control
over their prosecutors.155
The Supreme Court has not welcomed constitutional challenges
to prosecutorial abuse of power. In Connick v. Thompson, for example,
the Supreme Court found that the District Attorney in New Orleans
could not be held responsible for the misconduct of his employees in
concealing exculpatory evidence. 156 Litigation may nevertheless be a
worthwhile strategy for holding prosecutors accountable for misconduct
in some instances. For example, the ACLU filed a case against current
New Orleans District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro for repeated attempts to
coerce unwilling crime victims and prospective witnesses to testify by
serving them with fake “subpoenas.”157 State courts could and should
provide more oversight of their prosecutors than the federal courts have
been willing to consider. But lawsuits against prosecutors are not likely
to be a sufficient strategy to change a culture.
A more promising approach is using the electoral process as a
vehicle for influencing public opinion and prosecutorial conduct. In
forty-six states, prosecutors are elected, frequently in uncontested
races.158 Perhaps the best means of ensuring that prosecutors are not
disregarding the people’s voice is simply to choose prosecutors more
knowledgeably.
The ACLU has urged people to become involved with
prosecutorial elections: to question candidates for prosecutor about their
positions on criminal justice issues, to ask candidates to commit
themselves to positions on issues like bail reform, and to campaign for
candidates whose policies would move the jurisdiction in the desired
direction. Candidates are likely to respond to public opinion; and public
opinion will influence the choice of candidates.
justice-reform/483252/ (describing how New Jersey issues plea bargaining
guidelines to govern prosecutorial decisions).
155
See, e.g., Arnold I. Burns, Warren L. Dennis & Amybeth Garcia-Bokor, Curbing
Prosecutorial Excess: A Job for the Courts & Congress, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM.
DEF. ATT’YS (July 1998),
https://www.nacdl.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/98jul01.htm.
156
See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62–63 (2011) (finding prosecutor not
liable for wrongful conviction).
157
Anna Arceneaux, New Orleans District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro Breaks the
Law to Enforce It. We’re Holding Him Accountable., ACLU (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/mass-incarceration/smart-justice/new-orleans-districtattorney-leon-cannizzaro-breaks-law.
158
PFAFF, supra note 9, at 128–29; see also Lantigua-Williams, supra note 154.
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An ACLU coalition tried this approach in Philadelphia, a city
with a long tradition of electing tough-on-crime officials, from former
Mayor and Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo to former District
Attorney Lynne Abraham (who served from 1991 to 2010 and was
known as “America’s Deadliest DA”).159 For the Democratic primary
for District Attorney in 2016, a coalition including Philadelphia
Coalition for a Just District Attorney, Color of Change, Safety and
Justice PAC, and the Working Families Party encouraged voters to shine
a spotlight on criminal justice issues. Philadelphia members of the
ACLU alone knocked on 26,000 doors; fifty-one canvassers who were
formerly incarcerated were trained to discuss criminal justice issues in a
non-partisan way; and criminal justice issues played a prominent role in
election season debates. The candidate who won the primary and then
election for Philadelphia DA, Larry Krasner, is a civil rights lawyer
whose platform featured his dedication to ending mass incarceration, a
platform that resonated with Philadelphia voters. Encouragingly, the
more Philadelphia voters learned and talked about criminal justice
issues, the more they wanted a prosecutor who was committed to
reform.
The electoral model will not yield uniform solutions around the
country, only the solutions local public opinion will bear.160 It will
feature public participation as a desirable element in setting criminal
justice policy rather than deference to professionals to set and implement
their own policies out of the public’s view. This approach can be
extended to other elected officials, including police commissioners,
judges, and mayors. And a public spotlight on particular issues can
influence the choice and choices of appointed officials as well.
CONCLUSION
In the old Buddhist saying, paths are many. Criminal justice
reformers indeed have many paths from which to choose. The
introduction listed seven different parts of the criminal justice system
where changes in policy or practice could significantly reduce prison

159

Udi Ofer, Want to Roll Back Trump’s Tough on Crime Playbook? Then We Must
Elect Candidates Committed to Criminal Justice Reform., ACLU (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/mass-incarceration/smart-justice/want-roll-back-trumpstough-crime-playbook-then-we-must-elect.
160
See PFAFF, supra note 9, at 14–15 (discussing checkerboard nature of this kind
of reform).
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population.161 Any one of these could be a starting point. Part II gave
examples of various paths to reform by elected officials in federal, state,
or local legislatures, as well as administrative or judicial policymakers.
These efforts were frequently able to succeed where elected officials
were reassured that their constituents wanted reform.
But sometimes, as shown by the Oklahoma ballot initiatives and
the Philadelphia District Attorney race, the people are more reformminded than their elected representatives. Where that is true, the
people’s will should prevail. In the vision of the Constitution, the
people, acting as jurors and as spectators, have the prerogative to
ameliorate the harsh impact of criminal law but not to make the law
harsher. The arc of the Constitution’s criminal justice provisions bends
toward mercy and the right of all individuals to be treated with dignity.
The same balance of values should apply where the people seek to
influence the underlying criminal law itself. If the people in a particular
jurisdiction prefer to adopt strategies other than extensive deprivations
of freedom, like drug treatment programs instead of mandatory
minimum sentences, it is arrogant of legislators to insist on maintaining
ineffective mass incarceration policies in the name of protecting those
people.
But where public opinion lags behind what we know to be smart
justice, either due to misinformation (like the persistent misperception
that crime rates are rising) or lack of empathy (like failure to care about
racially biased policies or practices, or failure to provide adequate
funding for indigent defense representation), elected officials should not
take current polls as setting a ceiling for potential reform. The
encouraging lesson of criminal justice reform efforts to date is that
education about the realities of the criminal justice system can change
minds. The true art of politics is knowing when to lead and when to
follow public opinion.

161

See supra, text accompanying note 1.
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